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In two studies, we measured the degree and manner of  reciprocation of  a public good in 
subsequent two-by-two interactions. Both studies consisted of  two phases: a public good 
phase and a subsequent give some game (i.e. a gradual Prisoner's dilemma game). In the first 
study, the public good was a financial game in the lab. In the second study, the public good 
games were real life student projects. The observed behavior in the subsequent interactions 
was consistent with the reciprocity rule, but only up to the fairness norm of  equality. Students 
who had invested more than their fair share, did not receive more financial returns than those 
who had invested a fair share. However, despite the lack of  financial benefits, these high 
investors were preferred more as future team mates (Study 1), or received more social 
rewards (Study 2). We interpret these findings in terms of altruism as costly signaling. 
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1. Introduction 
Altruistic behavior has been puzzling evolutionary and social scientists for decades. The 
main challenge is the reconciliation of  the selfish processes that govern evolution with the 
phenotypic unselfish, costly behavior (Gurven, in press). Several potential mechanisms that 
bridge that gap have been suggested. One such mechanism is costly signaling. In this view, 
the cost of  altruism allows it to be an honest sign for some unobservable underlying quality or 
good intent. Altruism as costly signaling is characterized by the unconditional donation of 
resources to the community (Zahavi & Zahavi, 1997). Gintis, Smith, and Bowles (2001) 
showed that such a type of  altruism leads to an equilibrium under plausible circumstances. 
However, empirical evidence is scarce. Bliege-Bird &  Smith (2001) and Gurven, Allen-
Arave, Hill and Hurtado (2000) provided anthropological evidence that costly signaling might 
be behind some altruistic behavior that is observed in non-market societies. In this paper, we 
report the first experimental evidence supporting costly signaling as an explanation for 
altruistic behavior. 
Altruism is generally defined as providing a benefit to another individual at a cost to the 
agent. The mechanisms proposed to explain altruistic behavior to date fall into two major 
categories. The first category refers to genuine altruism at the individual level. The altruist 
bears the cost, but does not gain any benefit. This type of  altruism makes evolutionary sense 
if  one acknowledges that selection also affects other levels than the individual. We distinguish 
selection forces at a smaller and a broader scale than the individual. Kin selection (Hamilton, 
1964) reflects selection at the gene level. At the individual level, altruism towards strongly 
related individuals is genuine, because the donor incurs real costs. However, at the gene level, 
genes facilitating altruistic behavior towards kin actually benefit copies of  themselves. 
Specifically, kin are likely to carry the same gene facilitating altruism. This way, Altruism as costly signaling  3 
phenotypical altruism based on kin selection relies on gene competition. There is ample 
evidence throughout the animal kingdom that kin selection shaped a portion of  altruistic 
behavior (e.g. Chapuisat & Keller, 1999) and also among humans, it accounts for some 
portion in the variance in sharing (Gurven, in press). 
Selection also affects levels higher than the individual. Clade or group selection (e.g. 
Bergstrom,  2002, Williams, 1966) reflects selection on the level of  the group or species. 
Unconditional altruism towards unrelated people can survive when it is temporarily protected 
or isolated from selfish invaders (e.g. the haystack game, Bergstrom, 2002). Groups 
consisting of  altruists thrive (as long as they are not invaded) and therefore outnumber egoists 
in the long run. In this case, phenotypical altruism relies on group competition. Empirical 
evidence that this mechanism accounts for any variance in human sharing is hard to find. 
However, all else equal and irrespective of  the mechanisms explaining that selfishness did not 
invade the altruism, it is difficult to deny that in the long run, altruistic groups fare better than 
selfish groups (Gintis et aI., 2001). 
The second type of  mechanisms invoked to explain altruistic behaviors relies on the 
benefits for the altruistic individual. Although in the short run, the altruist incurs a cost, he is 
better off in the long run because he gets something in return. One type of  such altruism is 
cooperation or reciprocal altruism (Trivers, 1971; Axelrod, 1984). The long term material 
benefit (repayment of  group benefits) is the core mechanism sustaining this type of  altruism. 
There is ample evidence for cooperation based on reciprocity, not only in humans (Axelrod, 
1984, Gurven, in press, Wedekind & Milinski, 2000) but also in other animals (e.g. 
Wilkinson, 1984) and between species (e.g. Maynard-Smith & Axelrod, 1981). In humans, 
reciprocity can even be vicarious, in the sense that trust that an agent will reciprocate can 
emerge from observation rather than interaction (Wedekind & Milinski, 2000). Another type 
of  benefit that altruists can receive is social status in the community, with all its entailing Altruism as costly signaling  4 
fitness benefits (Richards, 1974, Wilson, 1975). Individuals with a high internal quality can 
signal this quality by displaying unconditional altruism. Through this behavior, the 
community members learn that this individual is worth having in a coalition (e.g. for mating) 
or better is avoided in a competition. As a result, this person becomes more wanted, and 
hence increases in status. Status increases mating success and access to resources. So, the 
altruistic individual is reimbursed with increased fitness during his or her lifetime. 
At first sight, cooperation and altruism as costly signaling might appear similar because in 
both cases altruism is under the selection control of  benefits for the individual. The major aim 
of  the present paper is to distinguish both mechanisms conceptually and empirically. Two 
studies are presented to show that reciprocity cannot explain all aspects of  altruism in our 
experimental session. 
Altruism as costly signaling is not cooperation 
Cooperation has several essential characteristics that follow from the selection process 
governing it. We will focus on these mechanisms that set it apart from altruism as costly 
signaling (see also Gurven, in press). The first essential characteristic of  cooperation is 
(social) conditionality. Cooperation involves an interaction between two or more individuals. 
The level of  cooperation strongly depends on the opponent's previous behavior (Axelrod, 
1984, Nowak &  Sigmund, 1998; Sethi &  Somanathan, 2003; Wedekind & Milinski, 2000). 
To give just one example, van Lange, Ouwerkerk, and Taze1aar (2002) showed that subtle 
communication distortions in a give some game (= PDG with a more fine-grained option 
scale) can lead to serious drops in cooperativeness. However, when the opponent always 
returns the player's investment plus one (i.e. Tit for Tat + 1), the negative effects of  noise are 
avoided. Further, Fehr and Gachter (2002) showed that punitive feelings aJ;ld behavior toward 
a player heavily depended on the player's cooperative behavior in a public good game. These Altruism as costly signaling  5 
and many other findings in the literature strongly attest to the importance ofthe opponent's 
behavior in the decision to act cooperatively and hence to conditionality. 
Conditionality does not playa role in altruism as costly signaling. The benefits that are 
provided by the altruist are not directed at a specific person, so they cannot be conditionaL If 
they are, they do not depend on the receivers' history (Gintis, Smith, & Bowles, 2001) but 
possibly on receiver's need for food (Gurven, in press). In fact, the situations in which this 
type of  altruism is displayed seem to be designed in such a way that conditionality is not 
easily applied. For instance, when a team of  hunters bring home sea turtles, they are donated 
to the host of  a large feast and the hunter does not have any control over who enjoys the meat 
(Bliege-Bird &  Smith, 2001). Similarly, the chiefs throwing community parties or potlaches 
cannot easily exclude people from joining the feast (Boone, 1998).Significantly, 
unconditionality is not identical to what Gurven (in press) called producer controL Producer 
control refers to the control a producer has on the sharing of  the product. However, 
unconditionality implies control combined with the deliberative decision not to differentiate 
among receivers. The first major difference between cooperation and altruism as costly 
signaling, hence, is conditionality. 
A second essential element in cooperation is trust. Trust is essential for cooperation to 
occur. In fact, people with dispositionally low levels of  trust, do not cooperate as much, 
unless they are pushed, for instance by salient reputation concerns (De Cremer, Snyder, & 
Dewitte, 2001). In fact, the communication and commitment effect on cooperation (e.g. 
Lindskold, Han, & Bettis, 1986; Orbell, Vandekragt, & Dawes, 1988) all rely on the increase 
of  trust in the opponent, with the result that the players reduce the risk of  being exploited. 
Van Lange's (2002) procedure involving an opponent playing TFT+  1 can be interpreted as a 
trust building mechanism. Further, the shadow in the future (reputation concern) increases the Altruism as costly signaling  6 
expectation that the opponent will cooperate (Axelrod, 1984; Murnighan & Roth, 1983) and 
hence reflects the same essence of  cooperation. 
In sharp contrast, for altruism as costly signaling, trust is irrelevant. The first reason is that 
no return is expected from the receivers. The second reason is that running the cost (which 
implies no reimbursement) is an essential part of  the signal. In other words, the expectation 
that the receivers would pay back the altruist would ruin the function of  altruism as costly 
signaling. 
To summarize, the essential difference between cooperation and altruism as costly 
signaling seems to be that cooperation requires a reasonable expectation that the other will 
return the favor, whereas such an expectation is at odds with the nature of  costly signaling. In 
fact, this expectation implies that the cooperator's behavior is regulated by a social contract or 
a norm.  In sharp contrast, the altruist's behavior is designed to signal more than normal 
quality, and therefore, he or she has to surpass the norm in some way or another. To conclude, 
irrespective ofthe sharing norm amongst a certain group of  people (Gurven, in press; Gintis, 
Bowles, Boyd, & Fehr, 2003), cooperation reflects norm conforming behavior whereas 
altruism reflects norm surpassing behavior. 
A delicate issue is whether or not altruists and cooperators are conscious of  the function 
of  their altruism, and more importantly, whether or not the awareness is different for 
cooperation and altruism. That is, altruists might be unaware of  the ultimate rewards that 
motivate their efforts, or they might be very skilled in avoiding the impression that they 
consciously aim at harvesting material or even social rewards in the future. To avoid that this 
complicated issue renders our operationalization equivocal, for the time being we focused on 
social consequences of  naturally occurring cooperation and altruism. We leave the awareness 
question for future research. Specifically, we expected that behavior that conforms to the 
norm (=cooperation) would be reciprocated materially but that behavior that surpasses the Altruism as costly signaling  7 
norm (=altruism) would not be reciprocated with material means. Rather, norm surpassing 
behavior should be rewarded with social rewards or 'honor'. 
In the present paper, we present two studies that test this prediction. In the first study, we 
measured the impact of  altruism, cooperation, and defection that naturally occurred in the lab 
on anonymous monetary and non-monetary rewards. In the second study, we assessed the 
impact that naturally occurring altruism, cooperation, or free-riding in student teams had on 
anonymous monetary and non-monetary rewards measured. Twice it was found that doing 
more than the norm is not returned monetarily: opponents return the normative amount of 
money. However, altruists receive more social rewards. 
Study 1. Give and you shall be honored: the laboratory version 
We created an opportunity for participants to display altruism in a social dilemma in the 
lab. They played a public good game (without provision point) and had to announce how 
much of  their endowment they would invest in the public good. Afterwards, they played 
anonymous give some games (e.g. Van Lange et aI., 2002) against each other and did so two-
by-two. We further measured with whom they would like to team up in the future (e.g. to 
make group assignments). As a control variable, we also measured the level of  friendship 
between all participants. Because the game was public, knowing each other might have a 
substantial effect on sharing decisions. Finally, in many game experiments, the endowments 
are obtained without effort. Possibly, this situation is not appropriate to display altruism 
because the cost of  sharing is too low (the windfall effect, e.g. Kameda, Takezawa, Tindale, 
&  Smith, 2002). On the other hand, it might also enhance altruistic behavior exactly because 
ofthe low cost. To avoid that this artificial feature would hide or boost altruistic behavior, we 
manipulated how much effort would be required to obtain the individual endowment. In one 
condition, participants had to work for their endowment. In the other (yoked) condition, they Altruism as costly signaling  8 
received the endowment for free. If  sharing depends on effort (e.g. Miller, 1977), the 
predicted effect should be obtained only in the work condition. If  sharing depends on 
possession in itself, then the effect should generalize irrespective of  effort invested. 
Method 
Participants 
Students were invited to the lab in groups of  4-6. There were 4 groups of  4, 2 groups of  5, 
and 8 groups of  6, totaling 74 participants. Half of  the groups were assigned to the "work" 
public good game condition and the other half  to the "free" public good game condition 
(yoked to the first condition). Forty participants were women and 34 were men. The ages 
ranged between 18 and 25, with an average of21 years. Both factors did not have effects and 
are not discussed further. Participants were recruited from a diversity of  study orientations, 
with a majority from the social sciences. They participated in return for a fee that varied with 
their performance during the games (from €7.90 to €9.30, €1  :::; $1). 
Procedure 
Once all the participants had arrived, they were seated around a group of  6 tables. The 
tables were arranged in a square. Before them there was a number from 1 to 4,5, or 6 
(depending on group size), clearly written on a cardboard. The experimenter introduced 
himself and invited them to start reading instructions. 
In the 'work' public good game, they were explained that they would have to generate as 
many examples of  a concept as possible during two minutes. We further explained that they 
would be asked to contribute to the group afterwards (but did not mention that this would 
happen publicly). They were told that every example of  the concept they would contribute 
would be doubled and be redistributed among the group members. A numeric example 
showing the behavior and outcomes for a group of  three players was provided, one of  which 
had contributed a lot,  another a little, and another one had made an average contribution. Altruism as costly signaling  9 
They were also told that the number of concepts they would end up with were worth one cent 
each. 
In the actual generation phase, they had to generate car brands. When the two minutes had 
passed, the experimenter asked the players to count the car brands they had generated 
(ranging from 9 to 30). They were asked to decide how many they wished to contribute to the 
group (for simplicity and comparability, we ignored doubles). They then had to read in public 
the number of  car brands they had generated, and the number of  car brands they contributed 
to the group. 
In the 'free' public good game, the participants received a similar introduction, but the 
example of  generating concepts was omitted. Instead of  having to generate their possessions, 
they were assigned a certain number of  eurocents (yoked to the other condition, see above). 
They then had to decide how much of  their endowment they wished to contribute to the 
group. They had to read aloud the initial amount they had been assigned and the amount they 
contributed, in exactly the same way as in the 'work' public good game. 
From hereon, the procedure was identical in both conditions. They had to playa give 
some game with each of  the other group members separately. For each other group member, 
they received €0.20, and they had to decide how many cents they would keep to themselves, 
and how many cents they would give to the other. The amount given was doubled. Appendix 
A shows the pay-off matrix for this game. 
Finally, they received a questionnaire checking whether they had understood the 
procedure. All participants understood that everyone would be better off if  everybody 
contributed rather than kept all their money. We also asked with whom they would like to 
team up in the future (on a seven-point likert scale) and to what extent they knew the others 
beforehand. They had to check the highest category that applied for each opponent on a 6-
point scale:  1:  'never seen before'; 2:  'know his or her face', 3:  'know his or her name', 4: Altruism as costly signaling  10 
'spoke to him or her before', 5:  'I already worked with him or her', 6:  'is a good friend'.  This 
measure was found to be nearly dichotomous: friends (6) vs. strangers (0) and was treated as 
such in the remainder. The scores below 4 were merged (never interacted) as well as those 
above 3 (interacted). 
Results and discussion 
The unit of  analysis was the pair wise decision from the point of  view ofthe receiver (n= 
328). The two dependent variables were the amount of  money (0-20) and the score on the 
popularity rating (1-7) each player received from each other player in their group. We call 
these respectively the monetary return and the social return. Both measures were standardized 
to allow comparisons between the measures. The independent variables were effort (two 
levels: the work condition vs. the free condition), friendship (two levels, high, n = 65 or low, 
n =  263, measured), and relative investment, which reflects the proportion of  the endowment 
the player had invested in the public good in phase 1. The relative investment was also 
standardized to allow interpretation of  the estimated parameter. All interaction terms were 
also included. To test the core hypothesis, we also included the squared relative investment, 
and the interaction with the two other factors (effort and friendship). In this type of 
experiment with public interaction, social behavior could also be affected by the group 
atmosphere. To control for this, we added the group as an independent variable (nested in 
condition, Kirk, 1995). Further, because each the players might also differ with respect to 
how much they give in general, we included giver as an additional independent factor (nested 
in group). These additional controls produce more reliable tests of  the target effects (Kirk, 
1995). 
We will first report the results pertaining to the predicted effect, and then proceed with the 
moderating results. All omitted ps are smaller than .01 or beyond. Relative investment in 
phase 1 was positively related to return in general: F(1,245) = 9.64 and type of  return did not Altruism as costly signaling  11 
interact with relative investment, F(1,245) < 1.0, ns. This replicates the reciprocity effect that 
is typical for cooperative behavior. More interestingly, we found an interaction between the 
quadratic relative investment and type of  return: F(1,245) =  5.61,p < .02. Specifically, for the 
monetary return, the quadratic relative investment was significant: F(1,245) =  8.94. For the 
social return, it was not, F <1.0, ns. Figure 1 shows the best fitting curve for the monetary 
return. It shows that the relation between the relative investment in phase 1 and monetary 
return increases upwards to around a relative investment of 50%, and then levels off. This 
level is close to 10 (= 50% of  the endowment in the give some game in phase 2). Assuming 
that the social norm is giving half of  one's endowment in these types of  games (see Gintis et 
al., 2003), this result suggests that reciprocity rules shape behavior up to the norm and that 
return ceases to follow relative investment beyond the norm. Interestingly, the work 
manipulation did not interact with neither the linear nor the quadratic effects mentioned above 
(both Fs < 1.0, ns). 
Figure 1. Received amount of  money in the give-some game of  phase 2 as a function of  the 
relative investment in the public good in phase 1 ....  c 
::s  o 
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There are some additional effects worth mentioning. Obviously, friendship had an important 
main effect, F(1,245) = 75.19, but it was stronger for the measure 'preference as a partner' 
(F(1,245) = 9S.9) than for received money (F(1,245) = 10.1; interaction: F(1,245) = 67.51). 
Furthermore, friends received only slightly more in the effort condition than in the free 
condition (F(1,245) =  3.S0,p =  .OS) but this was due to the effect of  effort condition on 
relative investment (see below). Finally, the effect of  relative investment was somewhat 
smaller for friends than for strangers (F(1,245) =  2.93,p =  .09), but this two-way interaction 
was qualified by a three-way interaction with type of  measure: F(1,245) =  3.39,p < .07. 
Specifically, the buffering effect of friendship was evident only for the social measure 
(F(1,245) = 4.2S,p < .04) and not for the monetary measure (F(1,245) < 1.0). Obviously, one Altruism as costly signaling  13 
public good decision, no matter how asocial, should not ruin the friend's mutual preference to 
coliaborate. These plausible [mdings add to the validity of  our procedure. Finally, the effects 
of  both the group factor (F(12,60) = 4.72, and donor (F(60,249) = 8.58) were substantial. 
We conducted two additional analyses. First we evaluated contribution in phase 1 as a 
function of  effort condition, group (nested in condition), and possession. We found that 
having to work for the endowment reduces the relative investment from M =  76% to M = 
54%: F(1,12) = 7.98,p < 0.02. Combined with the lack of  interaction between the quadratic 
effect of  relative investment and effort condition in the previous analysis, this means that 
effort does not change the reaction of  the observers, but rather the willingness of  the giver to 
display altruism. Interestingly, high possession reduced the relative investment slightly 
(F(1,327) = 4.91,p < .03). 
Finally, it is interesting to explore to what extent relative investment in phase 1 actually 
predicted the same person's cooperative behavior in phase 2. Across all participants, we 
found a strong correlation between average money contributed to the public good in phase 1 
and average amount given to the others in the give some game (phase 2, averaged across 
opponents):  r =  0.56, P < .0001, n =  74. This correlation was not affected by effort condition 
(F(1,70) < 1). This suggests that behavior in phase 1 is actually predictive for behavior in 
phase 2, irrespective of  means, and hence that reputation information is indeed a good guide 
to predict whether or not a player will cooperate. 
Four issues need to be considered. First, one could object to our use in phase 1 of  relative 
investment rather than absolute investment as a marker of  altruistic behavior. However, 
altruism is defined in terms of  benefits to others relative to costs to the giver. Further, in this 
study, possession was not related to the trait of  interest at all. Therefore, in this study, relative 
investment is a better operationalization of  altruism than absolute investment. Altruism as costly signaling  14 
The second issue that we need to consider is the fact that people may stop returning 
investments beyond a certain level because those who invest more than the noml are 
'suckers'. The fact that the altruists are popular to team up with can be consistent with the 
sucker interpretation if  one considers that it might be easier to free ride in a team with a 
sucker. To rule out this interpretation, we included a stronger social return measure in the 
next study that is not consistent with the sucker interpretation. 
A third issue is the vagueness ofthe norm in phase 1 ofthis study. Because people did not 
agree on the norm, it is difficult to be sure that they surpassed the norm. To reduce these 
concerns, the second study made use of  a naturalistically evolving reputation and a subjective 
evaluation of  the norm in this situation. 
A final issue is related to a possible methodological artifact for our main result. That is, 
the lack of  quadratic relation between relative investment and popularity score could be 
related to the type of  scale. Specifically, the higher scale points might be relatively closer to 
each other than the lower scale points, which might hide an actual quadratic trend. In this case 
the whole quadratic trend (both in the material and social measures) might be due to 
logarithmically decreasing perceived value of  higher investments. To rule out this 
interpretation in Study 2, we measured the social and monetary return measures with a highly 
similar scale. 
Study 2: Give and you shall be honored: the real life version 
The major aim of  Study 2 was to replicate the major result of  Study 1, namely the 
quadratic relation between relative investment in a public good and monetary return and the 
lack of  this quadratic relation for social return. We adapted the procedure to deal with the 
potential interpretational problems. First, to increase the ecological validity of  the first phase, Altruism as costly signaling  15 
we used student groups with a substantial history of  productive interactions. The first phase 
was not played in the lab. Rather, it was a history of  interactions in changing study teams 
during a semester (13 weeks). The relative investment was measured by a simple question 
with five options centered on the option 'student x did his or her fair share'. In this way, the 
norm became relative and hence comparable over individuals. 
To solve the sucker interpretation, the social return was more valuable than a popularity 
rating as a team mate. Specifically, the recipient received something that had social value. We 
had two versions of  social return. The first version included points in an emotional 
intelligence contest. If  you think of  a person as a sucker, you certainly would not give that 
person a high score in this contest. In the second version points earned the right to construct 
teams in the following semester. If  you find someone to be a sucker and you are afree rider 
yourself, you certainly would not give the sucker the right to build a team. 
To solve the methodological artifact issue, all return types (i.e. social or monetary) in 
phase two were the stakes in a similar give-some game. The only difference was that the 
points had different exchange values in the different games. Therefore, any difference we 
observed in the relation between altruism and type of  returns can be related only to the nature 
of  the exchange, not to the difference in measuring method. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were a group of  42 students enrolled in the "Master of Science in Marketing" 
program (Catholic University ofLeuven) that had collaborated in several teams during one 
semester. They participated after having finished an exam. Twenty-seven of  them volunteered 
to participate (13 men). They could earn money in return for their efforts. Their age ranged 
between 22 and 26. 
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After the students had fmished an exam that took less time than anticipated, they read an 
introductory text inviting them to participate in a research. It was stressed that they were 
completely free to withdraw (13 actually did). The students played give-some games against 
each student ofthe entire group. The stakes in give-some games were points (20, for the pay-
off  matrix, see appendix A) that had three different meanings. In one third of  the games, each 
point was worth €0.01. In the second third ofthe games, the points earned the right to build 
student teams for the second semester. The student with the highest score in this ranking 
could choose with which students he or she would team up with. The second highest scorer's 
preferences (if  not already chosen) were used to build the next team, until all teams were 
built. To that end, they also had to give a top five of students they would like to share their 
team with. In the last third of  the games, the points were part of  a contest. The student with 
the highest score in this contest would be publicly announced as the most emotionally 
intelligent student of  the group. 
A table containing the names of  all students was provided on the first page following the 
instruction sheet. They had to start with barring their own name. Next to each name, there 
were two columns. One was headed with 'you give' and one with 'you keep'. The sum of  the 
two numbers had to equal 20 for each row. The order of  the games was systematically varied, 
whereas the order of  the students was alphabetical. On the second sheet, the same list of 
students was shown. All participants had to rate each student on two dimensions. They had to 
rate fairness of  contribution and friendship with each student. To measure fairness of 
contribution (i.e. defection, cooperation, or altruism), we asked "You all collaborated with 
each other in teams this year. To what extent did class mate X cooperate in these team tasks? 
(You can use both your personal experience if  you have any, and the information from 
others.)  They had to rate the investment on a five-point scale with the following anchors: 
'very poorly', 'less than fair share', 'OK: fair share', 'more than fair share', and 'outstanding Altruism as costly signaling  17 
effort and input'. Secondly, we adapted the measure of  friendship to the current situation 
because all people had at least seen each other before: 'To what extent would you consider X 
as a friend? Give your impression on a seven-point scale. The anchors were 'I avoid X', 'No 
friend at all', 'no friend', 'we get along, that's it', 'get along rather well', 'is my friend', 'is 
my best friend'. 
Finally, we also recorded the score on the exam preceding the experiment (n = 42), the 
grades on an individual assignment, and two grades on team assignments. We did so to gauge 
whether intelligence might increase the likelihood that people signal by means of  altruism. 
Results 
Not all students knew all ofthe other students well enough to evaluate each other's 
contribution. Therefore, ofthe 1107 possible data points (27 by 41) we could use only 524. 
Again, the unit of  analysis was the receiver. We conducted an ANOV  A with the received 
points as the dependent measure and with type of  game (3 levels: money, E.Q, or team 
building), fairness of  the contribution in the student teams (5 levels, from defection to 
surpassing the norm), and friendship (2 levels) and all interactions as independent variables. 
We again included the giver as a control variable. All omitted ps are smaller than .01  or 
beyond. 
Again, the contribution in the first phase exerted a main effect (F(4,467) =  5.77) which 
was almost entirely due to the linear trend. Having done more in the study teams yielded 
more points in the games: F(1,467) = 21.08. The cubic trend was also significant, F(1,467) = 
6.50, p <.02, but this is due to the interaction with type of  game (see below). The other trends 
(quadratic and quartic) were not significant (all Fs < 1.0). More interestingly, we found an 
interaction between contribution in the first phase and type of  game: F(8,467) =  2.06,p < .04. 
The linear, cubic, and quartic trends were comparable for the three games (Fs<1.38, ns). In Altruism as costly signaling  18 
line with the predictions, the quadratic trend interacted (marginally) with the type of  game: 
F(2,467) = 2.64,p = .07. Specifically, we found a significant quadratic trend in the game 
played for money: F(1,467) = 5.51,p<.02. For the E.Q game (F= 0.0) and the team 
construction game (F=0.65), there were no indications of  a quadratic trend. Figure 2 shows 
the interaction between the trends and the type of  game. 
Figure 2. Points received in the give some game (0-20) as function of  type of  game 
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To summarize, we replicated the general reciprocity effect. The more a student invests in 
his or her team works, the more points he or she receives in the game. However, students who 
go beyond the norm (i.e. by doing more than their fair share) receive differential rewards Altruism as costly signaling  19 
according to the stakes of  the game. Their excess investment did not payoff  in the money 
game, but it did payoff  in the games in which social rewards were at stake. 
In addition to the major results, it is also worth mentioning that friendship had an 
important positive effect on points received: F(1,469) = 93.3. This effect was not different for 
the games (F<l.O) but it moderated the investment effect: F( 4,469) = 3.49. To explore the 
friendship by investment interaction, we followed Aiken and West's (1991) procedure. We 
calculated the b of  reputation at low and high levels of  friendship. We found that the relation 
between the opponent's investment and cooperation increased with decreasing levels of 
friendship (b at low levels of  friendship: 0.24; C.L 0.16-0.32 and b at high levels of 
friendship: 0.08; C.L -0.01-0.17), suggesting that friendship buffered the reciprocity effect 
(like in study 1). The three-way interaction between friendship, investment, and the game was 
not significant, F(8,469) = 1.42,p > .15. 
H is also interesting to note that the correlation between cooperative behavior in phase 1 
and cooperative behavior in phase 2 (averaged over opponents) was very low: r = .04, ns. (n = 
27). Finally, we calculated the correlation (n=39) between grades on four different tasks and 
the average perceived fairness of  their investment in team works. The correlation between 
average perceived fairness and the score on two team assignments was close to zero: -0.10 
and -0.5, both ns.  The correlation between average perceived fairness and (1) the score on an 
individual assignment was 0.52,p < 0.001, and (2) the score on the exam was 0.39,p <.02. 
Discussion 
In this Study, we replicated the differential reaction to altruism and cooperation. Altruistic 
behavior in phase 1 was not returned in monetary value, but it was returned in social pay-off. 
So, in comparison with students who did their fair share, students who did more than their fair Altruism as costly signaling  20 
share received more points in the EQ contest, were entitled to more rights to build teams, but 
did not receive more money. They gained status, not resources. 
Participants deciding how to share their monetary endowment seemed to follow the basic 
rule "share equally", unless the other really exploited the team. Doing a lot yielded as much 
money as doing slightly less than the norm. In contrast, participants deciding how many 
points they should give to others in social contests, clearly follow a more fine-tuned strategy. 
Points received were clearly linearly related to investment in previous encounters, and this 
reward followed even beyond the norm. 
The present method solves the ambiguities in Study 1. First, the interpretation in terms of 
altruists as suckers does not hold here, because the altruists receive more points in the E.Q. 
contest, and more points in the time construction game. Winning these contests has clear 
advantages, so it is not plausible that suckers would receive these benefits. Second, the 
behavior in phase 1 was a naturalistic behavior, and the perception was subjectively centered 
on the norm. This solves the problem that the norm was too vague in Study 1. Third, the 
explanation in terms of  a methodological artifact is ruled out because the rewards were paid 
in the same currency for the three types of  return. 
Interestingly, academic performance was positively related to the average perceived 
fairness. Students who were perceived, on average, as having done more than the norm 
obtained higher scores on two individual tasks but not on team assignments. One 
interpretation is that intelligence might be the quality that the students signal. Another 
interpretation might be that students assessing each other's contribution have difficulties 
distinguishing effort from intelligence. Therefore, further data are required to support this 
claim. 
General discussion Altruism as costly signaling  21 
In the two studies reported, we found evidence for the distinction between cooperation 
and altruism. To avoid debate about the awareness ofthe underlying purposes, we focused on 
the receiver's reaction to altruism and cooperation. We found that receivers, deciding how 
much of  their monetary endowments they would share, return investments to the public good 
(such as a study project)  up to the norm, but do not follow the altruist beyond the norm. 
However, receivers, deciding on the social rewards they can provide, return investments in 
the public good not only up to the norm but also beyond. So, altruism does not buy resources, 
but yields honor. We first turn to the question why this differntiation might occur. We then 
turn to the question whether this is costly signaling, to the question about the nature of  the 
quality signaled, and do suggestions for future research. 
The most puzzling question is why receivers return social rewards but not material 
rewards. A first possibility is that altruism as costly signaling evolved from reciprocity. 
Reciprocity implies equality. However, ifthe extent of  exchange increases, some people 
might fail to return what they received. If  the receiver cannot return what he received, he is in 
debt. Norms might result from such escalating reciprocity. It  could reflect a point beyond 
which a large majority of  people cannot reciprocate anymore without risking immediate 
survival. Given the reciprocity rule, receivers people incur psychological debts. Returning 
social rewards might be the only way for them to ward off  punishment from the giver. 
Another mechanism might be that receivers realize the importance of  altruists in the group. 
As a way of  making sure that these individuals stay in the group, they might reward altruists 
with status. These rewards could serve as 'social glue' (e.g. van Vugt and Hart, 2004). 
Is the altruism displayed in our studies costly? In Study 1, altruists give more than half of 
their endowments, but they receive only 50% of  the other's endowment in return in phase 2. 
That is, if  they had given 50% oftheir endowments instead of  more, they would also have 
received 50% ofthe other's endowment. Thus, altruists lose money due to their altruistic Altruism as costly signaling  22 
behavior. In Study 2, altruists do not score higher grades than their lazy peers (there is no 
correlation between contribution and grade). That means that their effort is only poorly 
rewarded in terms of  grades. Furthermore, receivers of  the altruism do not return the 
investment in terms of  money. In later phases, their investment does not payoff in terms of 
additional resources. We can conclude that the behavior identified as altruism in the present 
two studies is indeed costly. 
Is the behavior an example of  signaling? Signaling implies a message and a receiver. The 
data indicates that the message is received, because the receiver's behavior is affected by 
altruism. That is, altruists are wanted as a partner (Study 1) and are entitled to more social 
rewards (Study 2). What is less clear is the content ofthe message. The findings are 
consistent with any quality (e.g. altruism, intelligence) or with good intent. In Study 2, the 
signal correlates with academic perfonnance. This relation can be due to the fact that 
intelligent people signal quality by behaving altruistically, but it could also be the case that 
intelligent behavior during team meetings is interpreted as altruistic, because these students 
contribute so much to the public good. The question which quality altruistic behavior actually 
signals is an important one and certainly deserves empirical attention. 
The fact that few people follow altruists in phase 2 could shed some light on this issue. 
Because all participants actually have 20 cents, sharing is not merely related to current 
resource availability. If  this had been the case, altruism would have been more common in 
phase 2. It seems safe to suggest that altruism is related to some individual difference variable 
that determines whether the present resources are shared or not, or at least interacts with the 
situational cues to determine whether resources are shared. Altruism as costly signaling  23 
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Appendix A 
A's  B gives 
Earnings in 
€cents 
20  10  0 
A gives  20  40 (R)  20  0(8) 
10  50  30  10 
0  60 (I)  40  20 
D 